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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Dans cette étude expérimentale, nous examinons les déterminants des contributions volontaires 
visant à réduire les pertes attendues associées à des désastres naturels ou des accidents industriels 
majeurs. Les sujets doivent allouer leurs jetons entre un investissement privé et un 
investissement public. Ce dernier investissement réduit, pour tous les membres de l’équipe, la 
probabilité d’une perte. La perte attendue sans investissement public est constante pour tous les 
traitements, mais la probabilité d’une perte et la dotation initiale des sujets varie selon les 
traitements. Dans certains cas, les sujets jouent en situation d’information incomplète 
(ambiguïté). Les analyses non-paramétriques et paramétriques des données donnent des résultats 
cohérents avec les études classiques sur les contributions volontaires dans les biens publics. En 
retenant l’hypothèse que les sujets sont neutres au risque, nous observons un comportement qui 
rejette, pour tous les traitements, la prédiction de l’équilibre de Nash de zéro contribution dans 
l’investissement public. L’occurrence d’une perte accroît dans la période suivante la probabilité 
de jouer Nash et réduit le niveau de contribution dans l’investissement public (gambler’s 
fallacy). Cette situation rend plus difficile la mobilisation des personnes après un désastre 
naturel. 
 
In this experimental study we examine behavior relating to voluntary contributions to reduce 
expected losses associated, for example, with the occurrence of natural disasters or major 
industrial accidents. We ask subjects to allocate tokens between a private investment and a 
public investment. The latter investment reduces, for all anonymous members of the group, the 
probability of a loss. Expected loss without public investment is constant across treatments in 
which the probability of loss and initial wealth vary. In some of these treatments, the participants 
play under incomplete information (ambiguity). Non-parametric statistical analyses and 
parametric regressions yield results that are reasonably consistent with classical studies on 
voluntary contributions to public goods. The Nash equilibrium, under the assumption of risk 
neutrality, cannot be construed as representative of typical behavior. The occurrence of a loss 
increases the probability of playing the Nash strategy at the individual level and decreases the 
voluntary contributions of the group (the gambler's fallacy), making the prospect of mobilizing 
the population after a natural disaster more difficult. 
 
                                                 
* This paper has greatly benefited from comments by Robert Baseman, David Dickinson, Armin Falk, and Jean-
Louis Rullière. We are grateful to Jean-François Bérubé, Charles Bellemare and Nathalie Viennot-Briot for their 
assistance in doing this research. We thank Vincent Trussart for his computer program, MEG, that we used to run 
the experiments. Financial support by Le Ministère de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie du Québec is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
 
† IBM T.J. Watson Research Center and CIRANO. 
 
‡ CIRANO and Department of Economics, Université de Montréal.  
Mots clés : Contributions volontaires , pertes publiques, risque, ambiguïté, 
données expérimentales 
  
Keywords: Voluntary contributions, public losses, risk, ambiguity, 
experimental data. 
 






Environmental disasters occur at a startling frequency: one need only think of the number of 
tornadoes and forest fires in the United States, or of floods in Germany and France during the last 
couple of years. The mad cow and the foot and mouth deceases are other examples of disasters 
affecting a great number of people in many European countries. For a given country, in a given 
year, the probability of such a disaster to occur is far from negligible. The financial losses 
associated with a disaster could often be reduced by a collective effort. It is, thus, important to 
know, how much of their personal wealth or effort individuals would voluntarily invest into a 
collective attempt to reduce the expectation of such losses. Are there circumstances in which people 
are more willing to contribute than in others? How can we ascertain, for example, whether the 
residents of a city will be prepared to invest in underground electrical cables to reduce the 
probability of loss associated with an ice storm as, happened in Québec and New England in 
1998/99? Will people voluntarily support a policy of a large campaign of animal vaccination in 
Europe?  
These are the kind of questions that we want to address in our experimental study of a stylized 
situation, where voluntary contributions to a public investment may reduce the risk of a big loss 
affecting everybody. The situation is similar to the one of a public good to be financed by voluntary 
contributions, traditionally examined in the voluntary contributions mechanism framework (e.g., 
Davis and Holt 1993). In our experiment, contributions to the public investment do not yield direct 
benefits, but rather reduce an expected loss.  A typical outcome, reproduced in many experiments 
on repeated public goods games where contributions to the public investment yield a sure benefit, is 
to observe substantial expenditures on public goods that clearly exceed the contribution predicted 
by the Nash equilibrium. We also observe a significant decrease in the contribution to the public 
good when the final repetition approaches.
1 Several explanations have been advanced to explain 
these results as altruistic behavior (Andreoni 1990, Goeree, Holt and Laury 2002), or by a warm 
glow of giving (Andreoni 1995). Another perspective comes from Sudgen (1984), who postulates 
behavior that is conditional, or reciprocal. Keser (1999) shows that subjects recognize and signal 
their interest in cooperation using reciprocity as an instrument. 
                                                 
1 See the recent reviews of the literature on this subject by Keser  (2002) and Holt and Laury (forthcoming).  
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In most public goods experiments, production of the public good is deterministic and continuously 
depends on the total contribution of the participants. Some authors have relaxed the continuity 
assumption of the public good production and introduced into their experimental studies a lower 
bound (a provision point), which represents the minimum contribution required for production of 
the public good (see Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker 1988, for example).  In these experiments a 
coordination problem may arise due to the existence of multiple Nash equilibria, implying that a 
player faces strategic risk with respect to the others’ behavior. Dickinson (1998) introduced risk into 
the production of the public good, suggesting that it may not be produced even when there are 
positive contributions from the participants. This is the case, for example, for professional sports 
teams when each member’s probability of earning more income increases with the level of effort. 
Dickinson's results show that the introduction of risk in the production of the public good has no 
significant effect on the mean contribution level relative to the baseline case of a deterministic 
production of a public good. Dickinson's example of environmental activists whose efforts reduce 
the probability of some species becoming extinct is a good illustration of the risk situation we 
examine in this paper. In our experiment, however, contribution to the public investment reduces 
the risk of a loss rather than increasing the chance of a gain as in Dickinson's experiment. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Loomes and Sudgen (1986) suggest that in risky situations 
behavior may differ depending on whether losses or gains are at stake
2. 
We examine various treatments in our experiments. In some of the treatments, participants play 
under the condition of pure risk, i.e. with the full knowledge of the probability of a loss with and 
without any voluntary public investment. In other treatments, participants know the amount of the 
potential loss but have no information about the probability of the loss and its potential reduction 
through contribution. We refer to this situation as one of ambiguity. In all of our treatments, if no 
contribution to the public account is made, the expected losses are the same. 
One of our aims is to examine whether, similar to voluntary contributions to public goods, subjects 
make voluntary contributions to reduce the probability of substantial losses, and whether the 
dynamics are similar. We are interested in how behavior varies with the probability of loss, whether 
                                                 
2 In riskless public good experiments, a number of studies have found significant differences in the level of cooperation 
with framing decisions as gains or losses. Andreoni (1995), for example, found that contributions are greater when 
decisions are framed as gains. Brown and Stewart (1999) examined the influence of initial wealth on the degree of 
cooperation in a public bad experiment. They observed no significant difference in the situation where, given low initial 
wealth, net losses were at stake compared to the situation where, given high initial wealth, net gains were at stake.  
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uncertainty matters, if contributions vary with the size of the original wealth, and whether collective 
contributions increase or decrease after a loss has been experienced.  
In the following section we describe the design of our experimental study. In Sections 3 and 4 we 
use nonparametric and parametric techniques, respectively, to analyze the data from our 
experiments. Section 5 concludes the article. 
 
2. Experimental  Design 
 
2.1 The  Game 
 
Let each of n players be endowed with e tokens to allocate between two alternatives, a 
private investment X, and a public investment Y. Let  i x , {} e xi ,..., 1 , 0 ∈ , be the number of tokens that 
player i invests in X and let  i y , {} e yi ,..., 1 , 0 ∈ , be the number of tokens that he invests in Y. All 
tokens must be allocated, i.e.,  e y x i i = + . 
Each token invested by player i in X yields him a private return of r Experimental Money Units 
(EMUs), where r > 0. Each token invested in Y reduces the probability of a loss. This loss, if it 
occurs, affects all n players and amounts to C EMUs to each player. The following equation defines 
the probability, p, that the loss occurs, depending on the group's investment in Y: 
 

















* p  is the probability of the loss if no collective effort is made, that is, if nobody invests in Y, 
and a  (a > 0) is a constant. The second term of equation (1) shows how the probability of loss 
declines with the group’s contribution to the public investment Y. At the limit, if ∑ = ne yi , then 
a p p − =
* . Thus, the constant a determines by how much the probability of the loss decreases if 
all players allocate their entire endowment to Y.  
Assuming risk neutrality of all players allows us to consider for each player i (i = 1,…, n) the 
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Under the assumption of risk neutrality, the typical public good conditions are satisfied if the 
following two parameters conditions are satisfied at the same time: 
 
•   If 
ne
Ca
r > , the return of a token allocated to the private investment X exceeds the expected loss 
reduction associated with placing the same token into the public investment Y. This implies that 
the dominant strategy for each individual is to invest nothing in Y. In other words, economic 
theory predicts free-riding behavior for all players.  
 
•   If  r
e
Ca
> , the collective return of each token invested in Y is greater than the individual return 
of the same token invested in X. The collective optimum is thus realized if all players invest all 
of their tokens in Y.  
 
2.2 The  treatments 
 
We consider five different treatments, in all of which we keep the expected loss in the 
absence of investment in Y constant. More specifically, with initial probabilities,  ∗ p  , set equal to 
either 20% or 40%, and the corresponding losses, C, at 1000 or 500 EMUs, respectively, the 
expected loss without investment in Y equals 200 EMUs in each treatment. Furthermore, for each 
token invested in Y, we assume that the reduction in the expected loss is the same in all cases. With 
3 = n  and  10 = e  in all treatments, the parameter a is adjusted to ensure that this condition is 
maintained. Specifically,  15 . 0 = a  when  % 20
* = p  and  1000 = C , and  30 . 0 = a  when  % 40
* = p  





aC  in all treatments. The 
private return, r, of a token invested in X is equal to 10 EMUs in all cases. Therefore, the expected 
marginal rate of substitution of the private investment for the public investment, under the  
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assumption of risk neutrality, is held constant at ½ across all treatments.
3 The participants begin the 
experiment with an initial wealth (account balance), W, equal to 7,500 EMUs or 15,000 EMUs. In 
some of the treatments, the participants play under conditions of ambiguity, that is, knowing neither 
the probability of loss if no tokens are invested in Y nor of the level of risk reduction associated with 
each invested token. They are, however, informed of the size of the potential loss. In the treatments 
with risk, the players have completed information of the size of the potential loss, the probability of 
loss if no tokens are invested in Y, and of the level of risk reduction associated with each invested 
token. Table 1 gives an overview of the treatment design. 
 
Table 1 











R20.7500 20%  1000 7,500  No 
A20.7500 20%  1000 7,500  Yes 
R40.7500 40%  500  7,500  No 
R40.15000 40%  500  15,000  No 
A40.15000 40%  500  15,000  Yes 
Note: The treatments are identified by the letters R and A, designating experiments conducted under risk 
and under ambiguity, respectively. These letters are followed by the probability of loss and the initial 
wealth in EMUs. 
 
 
For each treatment, we have eight independent groups of three participants. The game is repeated 
over 100 periods with the (anonymous) membership of the group unchanged over time. 
In the risk treatments, assuming risk neutrality, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained 
by backward induction: it consists of making no investments in Y. The social optimum is to invest 
everything in Y. In the treatments with ambiguity we have multiple Bayesian equilibria. Among 
those, we select the subgame perfect equilibrium of the respective risk treatment as a unique 
benchmark solution for the game with ambiguity. 
                                                 
3 This marginal rate of substitution for a riskless public good situation, was described by Ledyard (1995). Isaac, Walker, 
and Thomas (1984) called it the marginal per capita return (MPCR). In our model, the expected marginal rate of 















The experiments were conducted in the experimental economics laboratory LUB-C3E at CIRANO. 
The participants were drawn from several Montreal universities, with the bulk of students from 
business administration and economics. The instructions in French (an English translation is 
available in the Appendix B) were distributed and read aloud to the participants. A questionnaire 
was used to ensure that the rules were understood before the sessions began. The participants 
received an average of 21Canadian dollars for about one hour of effort. 
 
2.3 Objectives  
 
Among our broader goals in this study is to ascertain whether, under the various treatments, 
participants make voluntary contributions to reduce the risk of substantial losses at a level similar to 
the one in public goods situations where each contribution yields a visible return (33 percent 
following Ledyard 1995). Do contributions show similar dynamics leading to a decline of the 
overall contribution level over time? Do we observe reciprocity that shows in the orientation of 
one's contribution level at the others' contribution in the previous period? 
Beyond these questions focusing on the comparison with the standard public good situation, we 
want to examine how individuals behave subsequent to a loss. Is a greater collective effort 
observed? The event of a loss occurring provides the occasion for a reassessment of the 
participant’s strategy, and one would expect a natural disaster to galvanize efforts geared at 
prevention. This corresponds to the availability hypothesis that a recent loss is more available in 
memory (Tversky and Kahneman 1973) and thus temporarily increases the subjective probability of 
a current loss. However, individuals may have the opposite reaction, supposing that such an event is 
not likely to recur soon. This obviously implies an erroneous belief in conditional probabilities, a 
form of gambler's fallacy as in Camerer and Kunreuther (1989a). 
Furthermore, based on the comparison of the various treatments, we attempt to answer the 
following three questions: 
 
(Q1)  Do people respond differently to ambiguity than to risk? Comparison of the results of 
experiments R20.7500 and A20.7500, and those of R40.15000 and A40.15000, will reveal 
whether or not participants respond with less collective effort (or less reciprocity toward 
others’ efforts) to ambiguity than to risk?  In Cohen, Jaffray and Said (1987), this is referred 
to being pessimistic or averse to  ambiguity.  Camerer  and  Kunreuther  (1989a)  
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observe that, in an experimental insurance market, prices are not affected by ambiguity 
about the probability of a loss. 
 
(Q2)  Is people's behavior affected by whether they face a small or a large probability of a loss? 
Comparison of the R20.7500 and R40.7500 treatments will illustrate the role played by the 
different probabilities of a loss. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) observe that individuals 
overestimate small probabilities in lotteries. Other authors (see Camerer and Kunreuther 
1989b) find that small probabilities are ignored. An objection could be made that 20% is not 
a small probability although, compared to 40%, it is relatively small. To generate several 
losses with extremely small probabilities in the laboratory we would need to have our 
participants play a very large number (thousands) of periods. This would impose logistic 
problems and, in particular, participants would likely become bored or tired of the game.  
 
(Q3)  Does initial wealth affect people's behavior when a subject's account balance might become 
negative? Comparison of R40.7500 and R40.15000 will reveal the role played by different 
initial wealth. Brown and Stewart (1999) observed no significant wealth effect (see also 
Footnote 2). It should be noted that for the treatments in which the initial wealth is 7500 
EMUs, the mathematical expectation is of a negative concluding wealth after 100 periods 
when no tokens are invested in Y. The real loss was ex-ante not obvious to the participants. 
They were informed that their account balance would be converted to Canadian dollars at a 
rate of 25 cents per 100 EMUs, but they were not told that they were guaranteed a minimum 
payment of $10 per participant. It is difficult to have participants experience real loss in an 
experiment, as was emphasized by Cohen, Jaffray and Said (1987). 
 
3. Experimental  Results 
 
Table 2 summarizes some descriptive results on the voluntary contributions observed in our 
experiments. Obviously, the dominant strategy under risk neutrality of zero contribution to Y does 
not explain the participants’ behavior on the aggregate. At the same time, the observed average 
contributions in all five treatments are far below the efficient level of the full contribution of all 10 
tokens. The average contributions in the various treatments, divided by the group optimal level of  
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full contribution, yield efficiency levels varying between 22% and 32%. These are below the 
average efficiency level of 33% reported by Ledyard (1995).  
 
Table 2 
Statistics on voluntary contributions (by treatment) 















R20-7500 3.25  3  2.11  5.25  5  3.23  3.27 
A20-7500 2.22  2  1.90  4.29  5  2.38  2.05 
R40-7500 2.57  2  2.47  4.17  4  2.82  2.32 
R40-15000 3.02  3  2.61  3.92  5  3.29  2.75 
A40-15000 2.88  3  2.63  4.13  4.5  3.19  2.57 
 
 
Pairwise comparisons of the treatments yield no significant differences in the contribution levels. In 
no case does the Wilcoxon-Mann-Withney (WMW) U-test based on the contribution levels 
(average or median) of the independent groups allow us to reject the null hypothesis (10% 
significance level, two-sided testing). Thus, neither ambiguity (Q1), nor the different probabilities 
of a loss (Q2), nor the different levels of initial wealth (Q3) have a significant impact. Note that the 
ratio of expected individual return of public investment and the return of private investment, is held 
constant across treatments.
4  
When we consider the average standard deviation of contributions in the groups, we observe 
significant influence neither of ambiguity (Q1), nor of the probability of a loss (Q2), nor of wealth 
(Q3) (WMW U-tests based on the standard deviations of the independent groups, 10% significance 
level, two-sided testing). We observe, however, a significant joint wealth-probability of loss effect 
on the standard deviation. The standard deviations in the treatments R40.15000 and A40.15000 are 
larger than those in R20.7500 (WMW U-test, 5% significance level) and A20.7500 (WMW U-test, 
5% significance level). In other words, the larger the initial wealth and the probability of a loss, the 
higher is the standard deviation. 
                                                 
4 Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984), for example, have found an important impact of this variable (the marginal per 
capita return) on observed contribution levels. This does not apply here.  
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Contributions to Y during the first period are of interest, because at that point the participants can 
only speculate on the behavior of the other group members. Furthermore, the first-period 
contribution frequently determines the long-run contribution level in a group (Keser and van 
Winden 2000, Fehr and Gächter 2000). In keeping with these previous results on riskless public 
goods, when we pool our data of all five treatments, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 
shows a significantly positive correlation of 0.307 between the first-period contribution and the 
average contribution over all following periods in the group (5% significance level, one-sided).  
Thus, and given that the overall contribution levels do not significantly differ, it is not surprising 
that WMW U-tests reveal that the individual first-period contributions do not differ significantly 
across treatments. According to Ostrom (2000), subjects contribute between 40 and 60 percent of 
their endowments in the typical public goods experiments in a one shot-game as well as in the first 
round of finitely repeated games. As can be seen in Table 2, our results fall in the lower part of this 
range.  
The contribution level to the public investment shows a tendency to decline over time. Comparing 
the mean voluntary contributions in the first fifty periods with those in the last fifty, we observe in 
each treatment a decline, except for treatment R20-7500 (see Table 2). The decrease is not 
statistically significant when considering each treatment individually. However, the sign test 
indicates that this decrease is statistically significant if we pool the observations of all treatments 
(two-sided sign test, 5% significance level): 27 of 40 groups exhibit a decline. 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of individual contributions of all subjects in all treatments and all 
periods. Obviously, there is a single mode at a contribution of zero token. Contributions of 6 or 
more tokens occur only rarely. This is in contrast to many public good experiments where a 
bimodial distribution is observed, with modes at zero contribution and contribution of the entire 
token endowment.  
Table 3 looks at free-riding and endgame behavior by treatments using definitions from Keser and 
van Winden (2000): a participant who always plays the Nash strategy, i.e., never invests in Y, is 
considered a strong free rider (only one participant in our study fell into that category). A weak free 
rider is a participant who plays the Nash strategy during at least 50 percent, but less than 100 
percent of all periods. We use a corresponding definition for weak and strong cooperators (requiring 
the allocation of all 10 tokens to Y), but not a single weak or strong cooperator can be identified in 
our experiments. A participant is demonstrating an endgame behavior if he plays the Nash strategy 
during the last period(s) after having contributed  positive amounts during at least 50 percent of the  
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previous periods. Column 1 in Table 3 presents the number of groups (out of 8 groups in each 
treatment) with at least one weak free rider. We observe that overall 23 of the 40 groups have at 
least one weak free rider. We conclude that weak free riding arises, but is not statistically significant 
(one-sided binomial test, 5% significance level). Considering the number of groups with at least one 
end-game player presented in Column 2 of Table 3, we reject a significant prevalence of endgame 
behavior (two-sided binomial test, 5% level) given that only 27 of 40 groups have at least one end-
game player. For those who showed an end-game behavior, we note that the longest end game 


















































Free-riding and end-game behavior 
Treatment 
(1) 
# groups with at least one 
weak free rider 
(2) 
# groups with at least one 
end-game player 
R20-7500 3  6 
A20-7500 6  6 
R40-7500 4  5 
R40-15000 5  4 
A40-15000 5  6 
All  23 of 40  27 of 40 
 
 
We know from previous public goods experiments (in particular, Keser 2000) that a subject 
orientates his or her contribution at the others' average contribution observed in the previous period. 
In Keser and van Winden (2000) such reciprocity is defined in a qualitative way: if a subject 
changes his contribution from one period to the next, he adjusts it towards the previous group 
average. In other words, he increases his contribution if it was below the group average in the 
previous period and decreases it if it was above. Given this definition of reciprocity, we observe in 
our experiments that in each individual group, subjects, if they change their contributions, react in 
the majority of cases in a reciprocal way. Thus, applying the binomial test, we may conclude that 
subjects significantly tend to change their contributions in a reciprocal way (1% significance level, 
one-sided test, overall and for each treatment). If we analyze reciprocity separately in the case of no 
loss in the previous period and the case of a loss in the previous period, we observe that in the case 
of no loss, again all 40 groups react in the majority of cases in the predicted way. However, in the 
case of a loss, only 28 of the 40 groups react in the majority of cases in the predicted way.  Thus, 
immediately after a loss, reciprocity is failing significance at the 5 percent level (one-sided binomial 
test). 
Thus, let us further examine the behavior after a loss, ignoring reciprocity. When we compare the 
number of cases that an individual increased his contribution after a loss to the number of cases that 
an individual decreased his contribution after a loss, we observe that in 23 of the 40 groups the 
majority of individuals increased their contributions while in 13 of the groups the majority of 
individuals decreased their contributions. We may conclude that over all treatments there is a 
tendency to increase rather than decrease one's contribution in the periods after a loss has occurred. 
This would support the hypothesis that a recent loss is more available in memory than the gambler's  
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fallacy hypothesis. However, this tendency is not statistically significant if we require significance 
at the 5 percent level (one-sided binomial test). 
What explains the observed decrease in the contribution level over time? The end-game behavior 
alone can probably not account for the observed decline from the first set of 50 periods to the 
second set of 50 periods. Over all treatments there are 31 groups where we observe more often that 
a subject's individual contribution was below rather than above the others' contribution in the 
previous period, while we observe only 8 groups where the opposite was true. We have seen before 
that in case that a subject changes his contribution he tends to increase it in the case that his own 
contribution was below the average and to decrease it in the case that his own contribution was 
above the average. We have ignored so far the number of cases that a subject has not changed his 
contribution from one period to the next. While in the case that a subject's contribution was below 
the others' contribution in the previous period we observe that in 54 percent of the cases the subject 
did not change his contribution, we observe only 39 percent of unchanged contributions in the case 
that a subject's contribution was above the average. Thus, the decrease becomes more important 
than the increase. This can explain the overall decrease. 
 
4. Regressions   
 
In our experiments, interdependence between the members of a group is a key feature.  But, 
since the groups are assembled randomly, and since their membership is anonymous, voluntary 
contributions to the public investment, Y, by other members of a given group in the previous period 
explicitly account for the interaction between group members. To explain individual data, in Section 
4.1, we condition our regressions on this variable to resolve the identification problem associated 
with this reflection problem or endogenous interactions (see Manski 1993, 2000). 
Our experimental data set consists of pooled time-series and cross-section data.  Each participant is 
required to play 100 times. The individual effect in panel regressions can be interpreted as an 
idiosyncratic measure of attitude toward risk of the participants (see Hoffman, Libecap and Shachat 
1998). Controlling for attitude toward risk is important since the subgame perfect equilibria 
considered for the risk treatments-also a benchmark solution for the game with uncertainty-assumes 
risk neutrality of the participants.  




4.1 Individual  data 
 
We consider three econometric models. The first model relates to the Nash equilibrium, that 
predicts zero contribution to the public investment Y under the risk neutrality assumption. We use a 
probit model with random effects to explain the determinants of participants playing this strategy. 
Let the latent variable 
*
it N  measure individual i’s propensity to play the Nash strategy in period t, 
explained by a vector of observable variables zit, the corresponding parameter vector δ , a random 
individual component  i η , and a random variable  it ε : 
 
T t n i z N i it it it , , 1 , , , 1 ,
* … … = = + + = η ε δ . (3) 
 
The two random elements are independent and distributed normally with mean zero. 
The latent variable 
*
it N  is unobservable, but we do observe individual i playing the Nash strategy in 












N  (4) 
with 1 = it N  if the individual plays Nash and 0 otherwise. Greene (1995) derived the corresponding 
likelihood function for this model. 
Our second model examines the determinants of intensity of preference for cooperation, 
*
it J , of 
participant i at period t, that is, how much people are motivated to cooperate in order to reduce 
expected public losses. This unobservable latent variable is explained by a vector of exogenous 
variables xit, the corresponding parameter vector β , a random individual component  i η , and a 
random variable  it ε :  
 
T t n i x J it i it it , , 1 , , , 1 ,
* … … = = + + = ε η β , (5) 
 
where, () 1 , 0 ~ N it ε  and  ()
2 , 0 ~ σ η N i .  
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To estimate this model, we use an ordered probit with random effects. We consider the number of 
tokens invested in Y to be an ordinal measure of the intensity of preference for cooperation of the 
participants. We must, however, specify how the number of tokens invested by individual i at 
period t is related to the intensity of preference for cooperation. Let the observed counterpart,  it J , 
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We arbitrarily define  0 = it J  as the uncooperative behavior of participant i in period t who invests 
between zero and two tokens. Following definition (6) this implies that the intensity of preference 
for cooperation is less than a threshold parameter  0 µ  to be estimated. Similarly, we define 
2 = it J as the very cooperative behavior of participant i in period t who invests eight tokens or 
more. This implies that the intensity of preference for cooperation is greater than a threshold 
parameter  1 µ  to be estimated. In between these two cases, we define  1 = it J  as the cooperative 
behavior of participant i in period t who invests between three and seven tokens. This implies that 
the intensity of preference for cooperation is between the threshold parameters  0 µ  and  1 µ .
5 Greene 
(1995), among others, presents the likelihood function for this model. 
The third econometric model explains the level of voluntary contributions, taking into account that 
it is a non-negative integer with the value zero often observed. We consider tokens invested in Y as 
count data. Unlike in the previous models, the explained variable (the number of tokens invested in 
Y) is not latent.  We now assume that participants decide exactly how much they want to invest in Y, 
and then seek to understand the determinants of these voluntary contributions. Thus, we use the 
negative binomial model with random effects in this econometric analysis. Explicitly, we assume 
that the distribution of the probability that a number  it y  of tokens invested by individual i during 
period t is a Poisson distribution with mean  () i it it x µ β λ + = exp . The random term  i µ  distributed as 
                                                 
5 Note that for identification purpose, when there is a constant in the regression equation of 
*
it J , we set  0 0 = µ .     
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Gamma with parameters () i i δ δ ,  produces the negative binomial model with a parameter that varies 
between individuals and over time (as in the linear composite-error model with a single element). 
To facilitate integration of the nuisance variable and obtain the marginal probability, we examine 
the ratio  () i i δ δ + 1 , which is distributed as a Beta random variable with parameters () b a, . In short, 
the random effect is added to the negative binomial model by assuming that the overdispersion 
parameter is randomly distributed across individuals. The contribution of individual i to the 
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… , (7) 
 
where  ()⋅ Γ  is the Gamma function. 
The standard assumption in such models (of count data) is that the probability of high counts 
gradually diminishes, becoming infinitesimal. Our data are arbitrarily truncated at ten, the 
maximum number of tokens that can be invested in Y. In the context of panel data this truncation 
issue is complex, and is simply ignored in this paper. Notice that when we aggregate our data across 
all treatments, the observed frequency of ten tokens invested in Y is 3.77%, and the frequency of 
zero token is 32.92%. Full discussion of this model can be found in Cameron and Trivedi (1998).
7  
In Table 4 we present the explanatory variables used in the econometric analysis, the symbol for the 
variable, and a short description of its construction. SEXM is a dummy variable for gender, followed 
by  D1PERD and DL5PERD, dummy variables to account for first and last period effects. 
LYOTHER records the other group members’ contribution toY in the preceding period. A positive 
estimated coefficient of this variable in the cooperation and in the contribution model and a negative 
estimated coefficient in the Nash model will suggest that participants tend to reciprocate to some 
extent the contribution of the others. Thus, LYOTHER is our reciprocity variable. Other authors, 
                                                 
6 See Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984).  
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such as Dickinson (1998), use the difference between individual i’s contribution and the mean of 
the other group members’ contribution to account for reciprocity. One difficulty with that approach 
in a parametric framework is the endogenous nature of a deviation variable.
8 It includes the lagged 
dependent variable and may thus be correlated in a panel model due to the presence of an individual 
effect. This situation becomes even more complicated in the case of the nonlinear models we use.
9 
The coefficient of the cross-effect variable LYOTHSEX  will measure differences in reciprocity 
between men and women. The variable LLOSS will permit to assess the participants’ reaction to the 
occurrence of a loss in the previous period.  
The other variables in Table 4 are associated with wealth. LWEALTH is the net balance at the end of 
the preceding period. This balance fluctuates and is generally positive, but it is important to bear in 
mind that it can be negative, and did indeed fall below zero in two treatments with an initial 
endowment of 7500 EMUs.
10 That is why we constructed the variables LWNEG,  LWPOS and 
LWPOS+, representing negative and positive segments of LWEALTH. 
An important consideration raised by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is that wealth effects on 
decisions under risk are nonlinear. In other words, utility functions are concave for gains (implying 
risk aversion) and convex for losses (implying risk seeking), where gains and losses are defined 
with respect to a reference point, e.g. LWEALTH. To account for such nonlinerarities in our 
regressions, we use a piece-wise linear form, as in Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1998). The 
wealth variable is decomposed in positive and negative segments, where the length of these 
segments is dictated by the need for sufficient observations in each segment.  To illustrate, 
LWPOS+ is constructed as the interaction between the variable LWEALTH and a dummy variable d, 
where  1 = d  if  LWEALTH < θ σ , with σ  the standard error of LWEALTH and θ  a positive 
parameter;  0 = d  otherwise.  We see that the effect of the variable LWEALTH, when it assumes 
values in the interval under consideration, is equal to the sum of estimated coefficients of the 
variables LWEALTH and LWPOS+.   
                                                                                                                                                                  
7 An alternative model to explain the probability of not contributing to Y and the level voluntary contributions is a panel 
generalized Tobit. However, this model supposes a continuous dependent variable, which is clearly not the case in our 
experimental data. 
8 We use a qualitative deviation measure in our nonparametric analysis of the data. 
9 Dickinson (1998) estimated unanticipated positive coefficients for the deviation variable. 





Explanatory variables of the econometric models 
Symbol Definition 
SEXM  1 if the player is male; 0 otherwise. 
D1PERD  1 in period one of the game; 0 otherwise.  
DLA5PERD  1 in the last 5 periods of the game; 0 otherwise. 
LYOTHER  Number of tokens invested in Y by the other group members in the preceding period. 
LYOTHSEX  Crossed-effect between SEXM and LYOTHER. 
LLOSS  1 if a loss occurred in the preceding period; 0 otherwise. 
LWEALTH  The player’s account balance at the end of the preceding period. 
LWNEG  The negative value of LWEALTH; 0 otherwise. 
LWPOS  The positive value of LWEALTH; 0 otherwise. 




4.1.1  Estimates with Pooled Treatments 
 
The nonparametric analysis suggests that there is no significant difference between the 
treatments at the level of the voluntary contributions. A simple confirmation of this result by 
parametric analysis can be obtained by combining all the data and differentiating between the 
treatments by use of dummy variables in the regressions. This aggregation relies on two 
assumptions: i) that the slopes of the explanatory variables do not vary significantly between 
treatments, and ii) that we can ignore the issue of variations in (unobserved) heterogeneity across 
treatments. Under these assumptions, to be relaxed later, we have the opportunity to examine the 
influence of certain variables on the probability of playing the Nash strategy, on the intensity of 
preference for cooperation, and on the level of voluntary contributions. Table 5 presents the 
regression results for the three models. For simplicity we restrict the wealth nonlinearity effect to 
two linear segments of loss and gain.  
Assuming risk neutrality, the first set of results reports the determinants of the probability of 
participants playing the Nash strategy.  If participants are risk averse, we can speculate that they are 
less likely to play Nash by seeking a form of collective insurance against expected losses. Thus, the 
regressions are not an unequivocal test of the Nash equilibrium. They present, nevertheless, the 
determinants of zero contribution to Y that we will simply associate with the Nash strategy. Note  
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that the random effect probit model is confirmed by the statistically significant ρ  coefficients. As 
discussed earlier, heterogenous risk attitutes may represent an important part of those individual 
effects. 
We observe a first period effect,  signaling a potential interest to cooperate, that decreases the 
probability of the Nash strategy being played and a last periods effect, an end game effect, that 
increases this probability. There is a gender effect with the male participants being more likely to 
play Nash than the female participants. In the event of a loss occurring, the probability of playing 
Nash increases in the following period. This suggests a ¨gambler’s fallacy¨ effect in the participants’ 
behavior. As usual in public goods experiments, we observe a reciprocity effect: the greater the 
voluntary contribution of other group members to Y, the less the participant will be inclined to play 
the Nash strategy during the following period. This reciprocity effect is less important for men than 
for women. For the wealth variables, an increase in the positive balance, LWPOS, reduces the 
probability of adopting a Nash strategy, while a more negative balance, LWNEG, increases it. This 
result is in some respect consistent with Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory, according 
to which people tend to be risk-seeking when they face a potential loss and risk-averse when they 
face a potential gain. In our experiment, if we ignore the strategic risk of the players’ interaction 
and consider the risk of a loss only, being risk-averse to loss implies being less likely to play Nash, 
and being risk-seeking implies being more likely to play Nash.
11 The coefficients of the treatment 
dummies are evaluated relative to the R20.7500 treatment (the omitted treatment). Ceteris paribus, 
the probability of playing the Nash strategy is higher in R40.7500 and and in particular in 
R40.15000 than in the reference treatment. Thus, both a higher probability of loss and a higher 
initial wealth in the risk treatment increase the probability of playing Nash. In the ambiguity 
treatment with the same probability of loss and the same initial wealth as in the reference treatment, 
we observe a small but statistically insignificant increase in the probability of playing Nash. The 
increase is substantial, however, in the ambiguity treatment  with a higher probability of loss and a 
higher initial wealth.  
For the intensity of preference for cooperation and for the level of voluntary contributions model, 
we expect the signs of the estimated coefficients for several variables (including the dummies for 
                                                 
11 We are aware of the fact that in our game situation there exist other risks than the risk of loss. For example, if we 
consider the strategic risk of a player's contribution to Y, not knowing the contribution of others, a player who is more 
‘risk-averse’ to the behavior of others should be more likely to play Nash while the ‘risk-seeking’ player should be less 
likely to play Nash.   
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the different treatments) to be opposite to their counterparts in the Nash model. Variables that have 
the effect of increasing (decreasing) the probability of the Nash strategy, should reduce (increase) 
the intensity of preference for cooperation and the level of voluntary contributions.
12 This is what 
we observe in our regressions with few exceptions only. For example, in the intensity of preference 
for cooperation model, the coefficient of the variable SEXM is not significant. It is significant, and 
negative for the level of voluntary contributions model. This implies that men contribute less than 
women to Y, but that the difference in the number of tokens contributed to Y falls within the 
categories we established for the intensity of preference for cooperation latent variable. Also, 
LYOTHSEX, statistically insignificant in the Nash equation, is positive and statistically significant 
in the intensity of preference for cooperation and in the level of voluntary contributions model. 
Thus, men react more than women to the contribution of others.  
For the models explaining the intensity of preference for cooperation and the level of voluntary 
contributions, we find estimates of the relevant parameters  , σ a, b that indicate the pertinence of the 
random effects specification. 
The coefficients of the dummy treatment variables are statistically significant (reference treatment 
is R20.7500). Moreover, there are clear differences between the estimated coefficients of some of 
the dummies. These results appear to contradict those of the nonparametric analysis. This 
contradiction may be more apparent than real, however. One indication of this can be found in the 
results for the level of voluntary contributions model, which, being the only model without latent 
variables, lends itself to nonparametric comparison of the means. For this model, in comparison 
with the omitted reference treatment,R20.7500, the coefficients of the other dummy variables are 
negative and statistically significant, indicating lower contributions, which is consistent with the 
results presented in Table 2. It is likely that to obtain significant differences the nonparametric tests 
require greater differentials than those based on the parametric estimates, since they are based on 
very few observations. Though the means of the voluntary contributions may be deemed nearly 
equal across treatments, the process by which they are generated might very well differ. To examine 
this issue, we now relax the assumption of equal slopes for the explanatory variables across 
treatments. 
                                                 
12 However, this does not have to be exactly symmetric as the latent Nash variable translates empirically into a binary 
decision while the observed matching parts for the latent intensity of preference for cooperation variable are categorized 




Panel estimates for the Nash equilibrium, the intensity of preference 
 for cooperation, and the level of voluntary contributions 
(Pooled treatments) 
 




Level of voluntary 
contribution 
Constant  -0.841** -0.670** 2.699**   
 (0.076)  (0.098)  (0.031)   
D1PERD  -0.899** 1.411** 0.659**   
 (0.151)  (0.217)  (0.063)   
DLA5PERD  0.268** -0.087  -0.092**   
 (0.042)  (0.062)  (0.023)   
SEXM  0.541** 0.104  -1.076**   
 (0.054)  (0.067)  (0.02)   
LYOTHER  -0.051** 0.038** 0.028**   
 (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.001)   
LYOTHSEX  0.015** 0.016**  0.009**   
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.002)   
LLOSS  0.333** -0.076**  -0.098**   
 (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.012)   
LWNEG  -0.118** 0.070** 0.118**   
 (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.007)   
LWPOS  -0.073** 0.078** 0.032**   
 (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.002)   
A20.7500  0.034 -0.975**  -1.064**   
 (0.067)  (0.091)  (0.027)   
R40.7500  0.699** -0.592**  -1.855**   
 (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.028)   
R40.15000  1.177** -1.573**  -2.262**   
 (0.077)  (0.092)  (0.027)   
A40.15000  0.906** -1.603**  -1.977**   
 (0.072)  (0.092)  (0.027)   
ρ   0.405**      
 (0.015)       
1 µ     3.256**    
   (0.01)     
σ     1.284**    
   (0.031)     
a     1.849**  
     (0.339)   
b     1.552**  
     (0.195)   
Log-L  -5483.86 -8527.42  -23685.30   
Number in parentheses are estimated standard errors   






4.1.2  Results by Treatment and Comparisons of Treatments 
 
In the Appendix A, we present for each treatment the estimates of the determinants of the 
probability of playing the Nash strategy, the intensity of preference for cooperation and the level of 
voluntary contributions. Relative to Table 5, we retain more complex nonlinear relationships (when 
justified by the value of the likelihood function) for the wealth variable.
13 We observe that the 
probability of zero contribution to Y is not overwhelmingly supporting the Nash equilibrium 
prediction derived under the assumption of risk neutrality. It could, however, be compatible with 
equilibrium predictions under the assumption of risk aversion. This result is in keeping with what is 
found in risk-free public goods experiments. In contrast to what is found in risk-free public goods 
experiments, the first-period effect, D1PERD, is never significant for treatments in which the 
probability of loss is 40%. The endgame effect, DLAS5PERD, which is nearly always observed in 
public goods experiments without risk, is present in our study in all treatments involving ambiguity, 
but only occasionally in the risk treatments. Reciprocity, LYOTHER, is less apparent in situations of 
ambiguity. The fact that a loss has occurred, LLOSS, always increases the probability of playing the 
Nash strategy. Together with the fact that the realization of a loss never affects the intensity of 
preference for cooperation, and sometimes reduces voluntary contributions this provides evidence 
that the changes in the level of voluntary contributions occur within the categories that we 
established to distinguish between uncooperative (0–2), cooperative (3–7), and very cooperative (8–
10). 
Our experiments allow us to introduce a wealth effect with losses and gains (see Table 4 for the 
definition of the relevant variables). We allow for the possibility that wealth has nonlinear effects 
on our dependent variables. First, notice that the nonlinear specification of wealth effects is always 
statistically significant for treatments with a 20% probability of loss. Furthermore, this nonlinearity 
is almost always rejected in the case of treatments with a 40% probability of loss and an initial 
wealth of 15000 EMUs
14. The question arises whether this is attributable to the fact that, with a 40% 
probability of loss, a good deal of noise is introduced into the evolution of the experiment, creating 
an incentive for the participant to avoid modifying their behavior. Moreover, it 
                                                 
13 Discussion of the detailed results by treatment is tedious and are omitted in this version of the paper. 
14 Because of multicollinearity, some of the coefficients of these variables are not significant taken individually.  They 
are nonetheless retained in the tables because of the results of a likelihood ratio test indicating specification error when 
they are removed.  
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appears that the amount of the initial endowment also plays a role. We observe that in the 
treatments with the higher initial endowment, 15,000 EMUs, wealth effects across the three models 
are similar, even when nonlinear effects are retained. When the endowment is only 7500 EMUs 
there is so little evidence of a pattern that the results need to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. It 
seems reasonable to speculate that greater initial wealth also ensures stability in the wealth effect. 
Note that negative wealth has been experienced by some participants in two treatments yielding 
statistically significant but different effects: negative wealth decreases the probability of Nash and 
increases the level of voluntary contributions in treatment A20-7500 but it goes in the opposite 
direction in treatment R40-7500. 
What about the effects of the participants’ gender on their behavior?  Generally, the dummy 
variable SEXM is more significant than the interaction variable, LYOTHSEX.  The results for the 
SEXM variable imply that women are more cooperative and contribute more to Y. At the same time, 
men’s reaction to the contribution of others is greater than women’s, a phenomenon that is observed 
for all treatments in which this interaction variable is significant. 
Finally, analysis of the marginal effects and the simulations to account for the relative importance 
of the explanatory variables (detailed results available upon request) suggests that in many cases 
effects related to the period, gender, and wealth dominate those related to the occurrence of a loss 
and reciprocity. 
 
4.2  Estimates for Group Data 
 
Table 6 presents the results of a parametric analysis of group data. The goal of these linear 
panel estimates, with fixed or random effects on both the groups and the periods, is to establish 
whether the number of women in a group, NWOMEN, exercises an impact on the average level of 
the group’s contribution to Y, and to test the impact of the number of losses during the preceding 
five periods NLOSS5P. Our results reveal that, though positive, the number of women in a group 
does not significantly impact the group’s mean contribution. As to the occurrence of losses during 
the five preceding periods, we find that in three of five treatments this variable has a significantly 
negative impact on the groups’ mean contribution during subsequent periods. This is in keeping 





Voluntary contributions of the groups 




  R20.7500 A20.7500 R40.7500  R40.15000  A40.15000 
  (1) (2) (1) (2)  (1)  (2) (1)  (2)  (1) (2) 
NWOMEN  -  -  0.1059 0.0958  0.3017  0.2604 0.3967  0.4507  0.2726 0.2685 
      (0.643) (0.637)  (0.541)  (0.513) (0.853)  (0.846)  (0.311) (0.306) 
NLOSS5P  -0.1859** -  0.04466  -  -0.1555**  -  0.03199 -  -0.1216** - 
  (0.0742) -  (0.0334) -  (0.0417)  -  (0.822)  -  (0.0475) - 
DLOSS  -  -0.4880** -  -0.0514  -  -0.3739** -  0.1739** -  -0.3246** 
  - (0.134)  - (0.0612)  -  (0.0754)  -  (0.074)  - (0.0844) 
Constant 3.336** 3.451** 2.111** 2.172**  2.463**  2.760** 2.478**  2.732**  2.816** 3.042** 
  (0.0559)  (0.0705)  (0.645) (0.640)  (0.747)  (0.713) (1.21)  (1.20) (0.435) (0.435) 
Ps.R2 or R2  0.689  0.689  0.00471  0.0000  0.0521  0.0824  0.0165  0.0269  0.0405  0.0575 
 
a Except for R20.7500 where a fixed effect model was used. 
** Significant at the 1% level 
 
With the specification (2) of Table 6, we further explore the "gambler’s fallacy" hypothesis with the 
DLOSS variable. This variable is a discounted occurrence of previous losses at each period t, 
computed for each group. Specifically, assume that by time t, three losses have occurred for a 
given group: one at  , 1 − t  and the two others at  3 − t and  10 − t , respectively. DLOSS is the 
discounted sum of ones weighted by the time appearance of the loss relative to t: 1 for the loss at 
1 − t , 1/3 for the loss at  3 − t  etc. Thus, a high value of DLOSS implies a bundle of recent losses. 
With the exception of treatment A20.7500, the significant negative coefficients shown in Table 6 




In this study we have examined behavior relating to voluntary contributions to reduce expected 
losses associated, for example, with the occurrence of natural disasters or major industrial accidents. 
It is recognized in the literature (see Kunreuther 1997 and Petak 1998) that the consequences of a 
natural disaster change a private prevention problem to a collective loss problem. Except for a lower 
efficiency level, and an unimodal distribution of contributions to the public investments, the results 
we generate are reasonably consistent with classical studies on voluntary contributions to public 
goods. The Nash equilibrium, under the assumption of risk neutrality, cannot be construed as  
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representative of typical behavior.
15 Both in the risk treatments and the ambiguity treatments, a 
higher probability of loss and higher initial wealth increase the probability of playing Nash. 
Reciprocity is an important concept to explain individual's behavior. The occurrence of a loss 
increases the probability of playing the Nash strategy at the individual level and decreases the 
voluntary contributions of the group (the gambler's fallacy), making the prospect of mobilizing the 
population after a natural disaster more difficult. 
Regression results suggest some differences in behavior across treatments. A first period effect, 
signaling a willingness to cooperate, is present in most treatments but not when the probability of 
loss is 40%. An endgame effect is particularly important in treatments involving ambiguity, but 
reciprocity is less apparent in those situations. The participants’ investments to reduce the expected 
public losses depend more on their wealth in the presence of a lower probability of a loss and when 
the initial wealth is smaller. Finally, the observed effects of wealth losses and gains are not always 
quantitatively or qualitatively similar across the treatments and perhaps more complex than 
Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory suggests. 
                                                 
15 If participants tend to be risk-averse, a possibility indirectly controlled with our panel parametric analysis of the data, 
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CONSTANT  -1.173** -0.692**  2.92** 
 (0.229)  (0.176)  (0.21) 
D1PERD  -1.863* 1.611**  1.08** 
 (0.775)  (0.223)  (0.129) 
DLA5PERD  0.462* -0.006  0.02 
 (0.217)  (0.179)  (0.066) 
SEXM  -0.246 1.269**  -0.90** 
 (0.253)  (0.146)  (0.201) 
LYOTHER  -0.093** 0.103**  0.07** 
 (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.007) 
LYOTHSEX  -0.019 -0.043*  0.00 
 (0.024)  (0.017)  (0.008) 
LLOSS  0.555** -0.033  -0.06 
 (0.073)  (0.1)  (0.042) 
LWEALTH  0.230** -0.106*  -0.06** 
 (0.079)  (0.042)  (0.014) 
LWPOS+  -0.092* 0.066**  0.04** 
 (0.037)  (0.024)  (0.008) 
      
ρ   0.357**    
 (0.068)     
1 µ     2.441**   
   (0.027)   
σ     0.854**   
   (0.044)   
a     10.04 
     (5.689) 
b     1.93 
     (1.083) 










Level of voluntary 
contribution 
     
CONSTANT  0.325 0.339  3.232** 
 (0.318)  (0.262)  (1.146) 
D1PERD  -0.144 2.100** 0.567* 
 (0.32)  (0.618)  (0.277) 
DLA5PERD  0.175 -0.355*  -0.132* 
 (0.106)  (0.161)  (0.059) 
SEXM  0.442 -1.450**  -2.929* 
 (0.328)  (0.297)  (1.14) 
LYOTHER  0.014 -0.120 -0.030 
 (0.033)  (0.069)  (0.021) 
LYOTHSEX  -0.029 0.170*  0.028 
 (0.035)  (0.072)  (0.022) 
LLOSS  0.382** 0.066  0.024 
 (0.069)  (0.1596)  (0.058) 
LWNEG  0.787** -0.659* -0.496** 
 (0.089)  (0.313)  (0.058) 
LWEALTH  -0.249** 0.133** 0.124** 
 (0.019)  (0.039)  (0.01) 
LWPOS+  0.048** -0.050 -0.043** 
 (0.017)  (0.027)  (0.008) 
ρ   0.417**    
 (0.03)     
1 µ     3.898**   
   (0.044)   
σ     1.574**   
   (0.09)   
a     2.021 
     (1.731) 
b     0.992* 
     (0.489) 
Log-L  -1102.33 -1387.15 4223.96 
 
R40-7500 
  Nash 
Equilibrium 
Intensity of preference 
for cooperation 
Level of voluntary 
contribution 
      
CONSTANT  -0.745** -0.156  0.527** 
 (0.125)  (0.157)  (0.045) 
D1PERD  -2.271 1.532  0.590 
 (1.851)  (0.913)  (0.31) 
DLA5PERD  0.045 0.209  0.060 
 (0.145)  (0.168)  (0.101) 
SEXM  0.984** -0.340  -0.820** 
 (0.154)  (0.179)  (0.052) 
LYOTHER  -0.031** -0.003  0.005 
 (0.007)  (0.01)  (0.003) 
LYOTHSEX  -0.052** 0.089**  0.061** 
 (0.01)  (0.019)  (0.006) 
LLOSS  0.321** -0.108  -0..159** 
 (0.058)  (0.919)  (0.035) 
LWNEG  -0.121**   0.175** 
 (0.028)    (0.024) 
LWEALTH  -0.069** 0.067**  0.051** 
 (0.016)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
LWPOS+  -0.014   0.007 
 (0.017)    (0.01) 
ρ   0.440**    
 (0..038)     
1 µ     2.780**   
   (0.027)   
σ     1.267**   
   (0.093)   
a    2.076 
     (1.302) 
b    2.576** 
     (0.482) 










Level of voluntary 
contribution 
      
CONSTANT  0.546** -1.573** 0.566** 
 (0.135)  (0.187)  (0.073) 
D1PERD  -0.601 0.509 0.400 
 (0.346)  (0.578)  (0.306) 
DLA5PERD  0.028 0.146 -0.114 
 (0.149)  (0.152)  (0.074) 
SEXM  0.275* -0.364  -0.695** 
  (0.131) (0.21) (0.068) 
LYOTHER  -0.055** 0.051** 0.028** 
 (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.008) 
LYOTHSEX  0.031* -0.036 -0.009 
 (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.008) 
LLOSS  0.268** -0.157* -0.104* 
 (0.054)  (0.078)  (0.039) 
LWEALTH  -0.082** 0.077**  -0.009 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
LWPOS+     0.021** 
     (0.004) 
      
ρ   0.426**    
 (0.031)     
1 µ     2.758**   
   (0.022)   
σ     1.366**   
   (0.079)   
a     2.108 
     (1.096) 
B     3.223** 
     (0.809) 
Log-L  -1182.69 -1903.10 -5005.18 
 
A40-15000 




Level of voluntary 
contribution 
     
CONSTANT  -0.657* -1.754** 1.225** 
  (0.291) (0.225) (0.091) 
D1PERD  -0.645 0.972 0.455 
  (0.612) (0.606) (0.352) 
DLA5PERD  0.636** -0.568** -0.563** 
  (0.127) (0.149) (0.096) 
SEXM  1.300** -0.131 -1.472** 
  (0.357) (0.222) (0.075) 
LYOTHER  -0.042 0.046  0.025** 
  (0.024) (0.039) (0.006) 
LYOTHSEX  0.023 -0.012 -0.010 
  (0.027) (0.041) (0.008) 
LLOSS  0.331** 0.035 -0.105** 
  (0.106) (0.047) (0.029) 
LWEALTH  -0.086** 0.098** 0.026** 
 (0.01)  (0.011)  (0.004) 
LWPOS+     
     
ρ   0.479**    
 (0.047)     
1 µ     3.122**   
   (0.022)  
σ     1.118**   
   (0.11)   
A     3.399 
     (2.433) 
B     4.839 
     (3.231) 
Log-L  -1124.38 -1840.26 -5010.43 
Number in parentheses are estimated standard errors 
** Significant at the 1 % level 
    *  Significant at the 5 % level 
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APPENDIX B 




You are participating in an experiment in which you are asked to make decisions. During this 
experiment you can win money. The amount you win depends on your decisions and those of the 
other participants. 
 
Participants make their decisions individually in front of their computers. Communication between 
participants is forbidden, and you are asked to refrain from noisy reactions while the experiment is 
in progress. 
 
During the experiment: 
•   You and two other anonymous participants constitute a group of three. 
•   The experiment consists of 100 repetitions, called periods. 
•   You remain with the same group for the 100 periods. 
 
Each  period is independent and you must make your decisions on the basis of the following 
considerations: 
•   During each period you will receive 10 tokens that may be invested in two alternatives, X 
and Y. You may invest all of your 10 tokens in X, all in Y, or distribute them between X and 
Y without, however, fractioning them. 
•   The yield to X is private, depending only on the number of tokens you invest in X. Each 
token invested in X yields 10 experimental money units (EMU). 
•   The yield to Y is collective. Each token invested in Y diminishes the probability of a 1000 
EMU loss being sustained by all members of the group. The probability of the loss when the 
group invests nothing in Y is equal to 20%. Each token invested in Y by you or any other 
member of the group reduces the probability of this loss by 0.5%. If all members of the 
group invest their 10 tokens in Y, the probability of loss falls from 20% to 5%. The 
following table yields the probability of loss for each number of tokens the group invests in 
Y. 
Number of   
tokens in Y 
 Probability  of 
loss 
 Number  of 
tokens in Y 
 Probability  of 
loss 
            
0   20.00%    16   12.00% 
1   19.50%    17   11.50% 
2   19.00%    18   11.00% 
3   18.50%    19   10.50% 
4   18.00%    20   10.00% 
5   17.50%    21    9.50% 
6   17.00%    22    9.00% 
7   16.50%    23    8.50% 
8   16.00%    24    8.00% 
9   15.50%    25    7.50% 
10   15.00%    26    7.00% 
11   14.50%    27    6.50% 
12   14.00%    28    6.00% 
13   13.50%    29    5.50% 
14   13.00%    30    5.00% 
15   12.50%          
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In the decision window displayed on your computer, enter the (whole) number of tokens you are 
investing in X and Y. If you are investing no tokens in either X or Y, type zero (0). The sum of the 
tokens invested in X and Y must equal 10. Your decision is confirmed when you click on the 
“submit” button. 
 
At the end of each period, a random draw that factors in the number of tokens invested in Y by the 
group establishes whether or not a loss of 1000 EMU has been sustained. Your gains for the period 
are determined by your return on X minus the loss of 1000 EMU, if it occurs. 
 
Your Gains 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be issued 7500 EMU in your account. At the end of 
each period, this account is updated with the profits or losses realized during the period. At the end 
of the experiment, the value of your account will be converted into Canadian dollars at a conversion 
rate of 25 cents per 100 EMU. You will be paid individually. 
 
Available Information 
At the beginning of each period (except the first) you will be informed of the outcome of the 
preceding period, i.e. your investment in X and Y, your group’s total investment in Y, the 
probability of loss, whether or not a loss was realized, the yield to your investment in X, your net 
profits for the period, and the balance in your account. A historical summary, in table form, with the 
results of the first period in the first line followed by the results of the subsequent periods, can be 
accessed by clicking on the magnifying glass. 
 
Additional Information 
Before beginning the experiment, we will ask you several questions to gauge your understanding of 
the rules. Before continuing, all participants must correctly answer all the questions. Next, we will 
request that you supply us with information concerning your age, sex, level and field of study, and 




You are participating in an experiment in which you are asked to make decisions. During this 
experiment you can win money. The amount you win depends on your decisions and those of the 
other participants. 
 
Participants make their decisions individually in front of their computers. Communication between 
participants is forbidden, and you are asked to refrain from noisy reactions while the experiment is 
in progress. 
 
During the experiment: 
•   You and two other anonymous participants constitute a group of three. 
•   The experiment consists of 100 repetitions, called periods. 
•   You remain with the same group for the 100 periods. 
 
Each  period is independent and you must make your decisions on the basis of the following 
considerations:  
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•   During each period you will receive 10 tokens that may be invested in two alternatives, X 
and Y. You may invest all of your 10 tokens in X, all in Y, or distribute them between X and 
Y without, however, fractioning them. 
•   The yield to X is private, depending only on the number of tokens you invest in X. Each 
token invested in X yields 10 experimental money units (EMU). 
•   The yield to Y is collective. Each token invested in Y diminishes the probability of a 1000 
EMU loss being sustained by all members of the group. In other words, the more the group 
invests in Y, the less likely it is that a loss will be incurred. 
 
In the decision window displayed on your computer, enter the (whole) number of tokens you are 
investing in X and Y. If you are investing no tokens in either X or Y, type zero (0). The sum of the 
tokens invested in X and Y must equal 10. Your decision is confirmed when you click on the 
“submit” button. 
 
At the end of each period, a random draw that factors in the number of tokens invested in Y by the 
group establishes whether or not a loss of 1000 EMU has been sustained. Your gains for the period 
are determined by your return on X minus the loss of 1000 EMU, if it occurs. 
 
Your Gains 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be issued 7500 EMU in your account. At the end of 
each period, this account is updated with the profits or losses realized during the period. At the end 
of the experiment, the value of your account will be converted into Canadian dollars at a conversion 
rate of 25 cents per 100 EMU. You will be paid individually. 
 
Available Information 
At the beginning of each period (except the first) you will be informed of the outcome of the 
preceding period, i.e. your investment in X and Y, your group’s total investment in Y, whether or 
not a loss was realized, the yield to your investment in X, your net profits for the period, and the 
balance in your account. A historical summary, in table form, with the results of the first period in 




Before beginning the experiment, we will ask you several questions to gauge your understanding of 
the rules. Before continuing, all participants must correctly answer all the questions. Next, we will 
request that you supply us with information concerning your age, sex, level and field of study, and 
university or school currently attended. 